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000002432 040__ $$acnudst$$bfre
000002432 041__ $$aENG
000002432 092__ $$aD04$$bA05.08
000002432 1001_ $$aJeff Dayton-Johnson
000002432 24500 $$aChoosing rules to govern the commons$$ba model with evidence from Mexico$$cJeff Dayton-Johnson$$h[texte imprimé]$$k[article de revue]
000002432 260__ $$aAmsterdam (NLD)$$bElsevier$$c2000
000002432 300__ $$avol. 42 (no 1), pp. 19-41$$bres. (ENG)
000002432 504__ $$aBibliographie : 1 p.
000002432 530__ $$aSupport : PH
000002432 690__ $$aArticle de revue
000002432 7730_ $$dAmsterdam (NLD) : Elsevier, 2000$$gvol. 42 (no 1), pp. 19-41$$tJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization$$x0167-2681
000002432 852__ $$aTUN01$$cBr.BIB.0186
000002432 910__ $$asoufiene 12/2005$$cCorrection
000002432 910__ $$aMiloud 10/04$$b04/10/04$$cSaisie
000002432 980__ $$aARTICLE